This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights...

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are ...

The paper investigates the reactive bargaining set, a solution con­ cept for TU-games introduced by Granot (1994), in economies in which agents exchange indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good (money). Under the assumptions that the preferences of the agents are quasi-linear and the initial endowments satisfy the Total Abundance condition, which is an abundance con­ dition on the mon...

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations, so that the nonwelfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can ...

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite...

In this paper we analyse the contribution of union activity in reducing earnings inequality. Given the specific nature of the system of industrial relations, Italian unions may contribute to inequality reduction through either national bargaining (i.e. reducing between-sector differentials) and/or local bargaining (i.e. reducing within establishments inequality). After reviewing aggregate evide...

Is plea bargaining, synonymous to pleading guilty. Day by day, partakers in criminal justice system are either in confusion or in an intellectual debate on the innovative changes in sentencing system under the Indian Criminal jurisprudence. Of course, root cause is the introduction of Chapter XXIA, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, containing Sections 265 A to 265L, which deal with plea ...

Collective bargaining, a core social institution, faces a fundamental transformational challenge. National survey data provide unique insights into the current status of the bargaining process — revealing challenges and opportunities. Awareness and use of interest-based bargaining principles is widespread but complicated by underlying tensions between labor and management. The findings illustra...

A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley (1969) has shown that there exists no ordinal, efficient, and symmetric solution to twoplayer bargaining problems, and has constructed such a solution to threeplayer problems. Here, Shapley’s solution is extended in two directions. First, it is shown how to construct an in...

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between withingroup and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are ch...