We develop optimal VCG mechanisms in order to assign identical economic “bads” (for example, costly tasks) to agents. The optimal non-deficit VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic budget balance, yet the non-deficit requirement is incompatible with reasonable welfare bounds. If we omit the non-deficit requirement, individual rationality greatly changes the relationship between burning a budget surp...

Vectorcardiograms (VCG) from a consecutive group of 77 patients with significant aortic valve disease were analyzed. All of the patients had complete left and right heart catheterization with normal coronary arteriograms and normal left ventricular contraction. Thirty-five (46%) patients met VCG criteria for anterior myocardial infarction (AMI-35%) and/or inferior myocardial infarction (IMI-14%...

Power companies such as Southern California Edison (SCE) uses Demand Response (DR) contracts to incentivize consumers to reduce their power consumption during periods when demand forecast exceeds supply. Current mechanisms in use offer contracts to consumers independent of one another, do not take into consideration consumers’ heterogeneity in consumption profile or reliability, and fail to ach...

In female athletes, iron deficiency and anaemia have marked effects on performance could also impair health. Female athletes often limit their diet to control weight, thus may not obtain sufficient iron. Iron is difficult absorb, so it necessary devise an efficient intake method. Absorption of non-haem seems increase when taken with ʟ-ascorbic acid (vitamin C [VC]). ʟ-Ascorbic 2-glucoside (VCG)...

The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mec...

Core-selecting combinatorial auctions have been introduced as an alternative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism because VCG results in payments that are not in the core with respect to bids, leading to unfair payments, unacceptably low revenues, and unstable outcomes. This raises an auction selection problem for an auctioneer deciding whether to employ a core-selecting auction or VCG ...