Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism is so strong that if it defeated physicalism it would, at the same time, defeat ‘substance dualism’. The purpose of this paper is to articulate this ‘parity of reasons’ objection. In the first part of the paper, I discuss Churchland’s argument. I demonstrate that although his formulation of the objection is not w...

The problem of interpreting quantum theory on a large (e.g. cosmological) scale has been commonly conceived as a search for objective reality in a framework that is fundamentally probabilistic. The Everett programme attempts to evade the issue by the reintroduction of determinism at the global level of a “state vector of the universe”. The present approach is based on the recognition that, like...

An important objection to the ‘‘higher-order’’ theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I d...