در این مقاله یک مدل ریاضی برای مسئله سیستم تولیدی همکارانه ساخت بر اساس سفارش با رعایت انصاف تخصیص بار‌های تولید طراحی شده است. اهداف اصلی مدل، کمینه‌سازی هزینه‌‌های کل و حداکثر استفاده از منابع به‌منظور عادلانه شرایط عدم­قطعیت کنترل پارامتر‌های غیرقطعی روش برنامه‌ریزی فازی ‌شده نتایج نشان می‌دهد افزایش نرخ عدم‌قطعیت، می­یابد. ازآنجاکه ظرفیت کارخانه‌ها ثابت است، مقدار تقاضا، هر کارخانه نیز می­ی...

This study considers the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison analyzes two different timings of games tax-then-ECSR (T game) an ECSR-then-tax (E game). We show that T game always yields higher than E irrespective competition modes, but lower ECSR under Cournot when marginal damage is high Bertrand comp...

Cournot competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot, is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility—naturally a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product—by deciding on the amount of production. This problem has been studied comprehensively in Economics...

We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium as well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path. JEL Classification Number: C 72.

We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertaint...

The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot–Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N/(N +1)). Market pow...

This paper analyses the impact of changes in product market competition on the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) and public goods supply when distortionary commodity taxes are used to raise revenue. First, less competition (measured by a switch from Bertrand to Cournot conduct, or a decrease in the elasticity of demand) does not necessarily raise the MPCF. Second, even if it does, optimal pu...

We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model. We show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Courno...

We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n−1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers whereas the first mover does not. Equilibrium incentive rates are increasing in the order with which managers select quantities. Letting ui denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager moves in the i-th place, w...