Modeling, Survey the Nash Equilibrium and Optimal Tax Fine Rate Determine in the Game of Taxpayers and Tax Affairs Organization

Todays, the importance of taxes as the main source of government revenue has been approved by economic policymakers and therefore, designing an optimal tax system to achieve this subject is essential. Governments are looking for ways to receive their target taxes from taxpayers at the lowest possible cost and at the declaration tax. Taxpayers, on the other hand, seek to postponed their taxes as much as possible and make the most of the effects of inflation. This paper models the game between taxpayers and tax affairs organization. The results show that the Nash equilibrium in the designed game occurs where taxpayers declare their declared tax less than the diagnostic tax and careful handling by tax affairs organization. In the next step, the equilibrium is somewhere that taxpayers continued their protest until the step of the Court of Justice (the dominant strategy) and tax affairs organization agrees with them (the dominant strategy). Finally, the optimal fine rate for the tax affairs organization was determined until taxpayers do not continue their protest to buy time and devalue the amount paid and agree at the initial stage 238.