Investigating the effect of ownership structure on banks' risk-taking behavior

The ownership structure is one of the important issues of corporate governance that can affect the efficiency of companies by influencing managerial motivations. The aim of the present study is to investigate the asymmetric effect of ownership structure on bankschr('39') risk-taking behavior. The present study was conducted using the information of twenty-one banks listed on the Tehran Security Exchange and the Iran OTC in the period from1390 to 1398. Using the Panel smooth transition regression model approach, it has been concluded that the influence of major owners in the banking industry on bankschr('39') risk-taking is different in the two regimes. In the first regime (threshold level of 23%), major shareholders have a positive effect on banks chr('39')riskiness and in the second regime (above 23%) have a negative effect on bankschr('39') riskiness. The results showed that the presence of major shareholders in the ownership structure of banks has an asymmetric effect on their risk-taking and based on these findings, one of the foundations for improving risk management is the use of appropriate strategies to concentrate ownership.