Employing a Multi-Criteria Approach under Bankruptcy Conditions for Optimal Allocation of Shared Water Resources through Using Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Method

Management based on the flexibility, fairness, and sustainability characteristics of water resources may play a key role in preventing the continuation of the crisis process as well as reducing water users’ conflict. In the present research, the framework for the optimal allocation of shared water resources was presented using a combination of bankruptcy concepts and asymmetric Nash bargaining. To this end, Atrak basin including Golestan, Northkhorasan, and Razavikhorasan provinces was chosen as the study area. The optimal answer to the bargaining method was compared with the results of water bankruptcy rules. The results revealed that considering different hypotheses, the proposed model could cover the results of common bankruptcy rules. Subsequently, for optimal and sustainable use of water resources in the studied basin, several indices like political, social, and economic criteria were employed to include and investigate the effect in the proposed model. Using Topsis-Entropy in the determination of the relative weight, it was observed that water users playing the key role in the water resources production in the basin would obtain a more equitable supply percentage of their demand. The results of multi-criteria water allocation in Golestan, Northkhorasan, and Razavikhorasan provinces respectively are 104, 809, and 164 MCM per year.