it is definitely necessary to understand the concept and behavior of causation of life insurance policies and its determinants for insurance managers, regulators, and customers. for insurance managers, the profitability and liquidity of insurers can be increasingly influenced by the number of causation through costs, adverse selection, and cash surrender values. therefore, causation is a material risk for life insurance companies, which needs to be studied, controlled and managed carefully and strictly. as we know adverse selection is a real obstacle in the life insurance industry describing a situation in which information asymmetry leads riskier policyholders to purchase more insurance coverage. we can call such kind of adverse selection, static adverse selection in the time of purchasing policy. asymmetric information has another result after passing a period of time, called dynamic adverse selection. such kind of dynamic adverse selection says that lower-risk individuals are more likely to cancel a policy during the period of contract. in this thesis, we assessed the effect of risk aversion proxies such as education, marital status, sex, age and etc on life insurance lapsation. we also examined the presence of dynamic adverse selection or dynamic advantageous selection in iranian life insurance market. when the individuals with high level of risk aversion (low risk individuals) lapse their contracts more than individuals with high level of risks, dynamic adverse selection will occur in insurance market; vice versa, when the high risk individuals cancel more of life insurance services than the low risk individuals (in other words, individuals with lower level of risk aversion), dynamic advantageous selection will occur in life insurance market. we used logistic regression and concluded that iranian life insurance market faces with dynamic advantageous selection and risk aversion affects lapsation of life insurance contracts through proxies such as age, gender, marital status.