Web Service Providers\' Game on Price and Service Level

Competition, complementarity and service level guarantee in Web services

  Network and processing overhead associated with web services is a significant challenge to its performance. As a result, web service providers often announce a service level agreement. This ensures that consumers, who pay for the service, can get the service at a given quality level. In this paper, we study the competition between two providers offering functionally the same web services, whe...

Joint Price and QoS Market Share Game with Adversarial Service Providers and Migrating Customers

In order to attract more and more customers, the price war between service providers (SPs) is becoming increasingly fierce. This kind of conflict situations has been analyzed and hugely studied by a plenty of works in the related literature. However unfortunately, almost all prior works neglect an important decision parameter, it is the promised quality of service which can be a serious advanta...

Analysis Tool for Web Hosting Service Providers

As the popularity of the Web grows, an increasing number of businesses are wishing to seize the potential market opportunities that it o ers. The shared Web hosting service uses the possibility to create a set of virtual servers on the same physical server. Each virtual server is set-up to write its own access log. Such implementation and set-up splits the \whole picture" of web server usage in...

Price and delay competition between two service providers

In this paper we study situations in which two firms offer identical service for possibly different prices and response times. Customers’ choice between firms is based on their full price, which includes the service fee plus (expected) waiting costs. We consider a two level game. The first game is a non-cooperative game among customers who observe the prices (but not the queue sizes) and then d...

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Price-QoS Market Share in Presence of Adversarial Service Providers

On Competing Wireless Service Providers

We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the competition of two service providers, for a generic channel model. Interestingly, the competition of two providers leads to a globally optimal...