Doing/Allowing Harm Distinction:A Description, Analysis and Critique of Accounts of Donagan, Foot, Quinn and Bennet

The subject of "harm" and its binary distinction is one of the most recent topics in moral philosophy which has been dealt with by some moral philosophers in the last three decades. In recent years, there have also been some Iranian publications under this topic. The do/allow distinction is one of the distinctions. Moderate and minimalist philosophers who are advocates of this distinction offered some reasoning to support this distinction as well as the prohibition of doing harm, but they have been criticized by extremist philosophers. The accounts that have been suggested by some advocates like, Donagan, Foot, Quinn and Bennet, are "interference with the well-being", "action/inaction and positive/negative rights", etc. The opponents believe that, by the reasoning of advocates of constraint against doing harm, doing harm is prohibited and allowing harm is permitted, whereas on their basic reasons, sometimes, allowing harm is forbidden as much as doing harm. So the advocates of this distinction must reconsider their reasons or abandon them. This paper provides a description, analysis and critique of the distinction and its critiques.