Bank Competition and Risk-taking in the Iranian Banking Industry
Authors
Abstract:
Abstract: The banking industry is one of the main sectors of the economy of any country, that its health is a necessary condition to play a positive role in the economic development of that country. The health of the banking system is assessed by the financial stability criterion, which is evaluated by various risk-taking indexes. On the other hand, the banks risk-taking is affected by various factors, the most important of which is banking competition. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of banking competition on the risk-taking of the Iranian banking industry during the period 2009-2019. For this purpose, banking competition has been studied in the form of two main structural approaches (using the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index) and non-structural (using the Panzar-Rosse statistic). Z and NPL indexes have also been used as a criterion for assessing the banks risk-taking. According to the results, the concentration index calculated based on the total assets, total lending facilities and total deposits of the 19 banks under review had an almost declining trend, which indicates that the Iranian banking industry is moving towards competitive conditions, while the estimated Panzar-Rosse statistic indicates the existence of a monopolistic competition in the Iranian banking industry. According to the results, the effect of the three Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes on banks chr('39')risk-taking is not always significant, while there is a non-linear U-shaped relationship between the Panzar-Rosse statistic and the banks level of risk-taking. This means that as the banking system becomes more competitive to some extent, the level of banks risk-taking decreases and then begins to increase. Also, according to the results, the level of competition in most years has been at a higher level than the optimal level. Therefore, it is recommended that in order to reduce the banks level of risk-taking, banking policies should be designed in such a way as to reduce the level of competition to an optimal level.
similar resources
Corporate control , bank risk taking , and the health of the banking industry q
We present evidence that managerial shareholdings are an important determinant of bank risk-taking. Managerial shareholdings are positively related to total and ®rm speci®c risk in the late 1980s when banking was relatively less regulated and when the industry was under considerable ®nancial stress. However, following legislation in 1989 and 1991 designed to reduce risk-taking and also re ̄ectin...
full textCorporate Governance and Credit Risk in Iranian Banking Industry
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the impacts of corporate governance on credit risk in the Iranian banking industry. The sample consists of 20 banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011-2016 and the statistical method is panel data. In this research, credit risk and corporate governance are the dependent and independent variables, respectively. The meta-synthesis m...
full textMarket Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry∗
We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks’ outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that ban...
full textBoard Compensation and Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of CEO Duality (Evidence from Banking Industry)
The purpose of this paper is to explore relationship between board compensation and risk taking with regard to CEO duality in the banking industry. Using a panel data regression model, with regard to optimal contracting and managerial power theory, we examined the data to determine the relationship between board compensation and risk taking of twenty one banks, for the period 2012 to 2018. R...
full textThe Theory of Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited
There is a large literature that concludes that—when confronted with increased competition—banks rationally choose more risky portfolios. We argue that this literature has had a significant influence on regulators and central bankers. We review the empirical literature and conclude that the evidence is best described as “mixed.” We then show that existing theoretical analyses of this topic are ...
full textRisk Taking, Limited Liability and the Competition of Bank Regulators
Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these constraints may not survive in systems competition, as systems competition is likely to suffer from th...
full textMy Resources
Journal title
volume 29 issue 99
pages 51- 60
publication date 2021-12
By following a journal you will be notified via email when a new issue of this journal is published.
No Keywords
Hosted on Doprax cloud platform doprax.com
copyright © 2015-2023