A Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Framework Under Uncertainty to the Procurement of Relief Items

Authors

  • A. Bozorgi-Amiri School of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
  • M. Khoshsirat School of Industrial Engineering, Urmia University of Technology, Urmia, Iran
  • R. Dabbagh School of Industrial Engineering, Urmia University of Technology, Urmia, Iran
Abstract:

One of the main activities of humanitarian logistics is to provide relief items for survivors in case of a disaster. To facilitate the procurement operation, this paper proposes a bidding framework for supplier selection and optimal allocation of relief items. The proposed auction process is divided into the announcement construction, bid construction and bid evaluation phases. In the announcement phase, the bidder (purchaser or relief organization) invites certain suppliers to the auction. Next, the construction phase is formulated as a bi-objective fuzzy model from the perspective of suppliers. This phase provides the bidder with several suggestions, each of which containing the amount, price, and lead time of the delivery of relief items. Then, in the evaluation phase, the bidder determines the winners and optimally assigns orders by a multi-objective fuzzy model. Each of the fuzzy mathematical models in the paper is formulated under the uncertainty of parameters and is then solved by a two-stage fuzzy approach. Finally, to illustrate the validity and applicability of the proposed model, a numerical example is provided and its result is analyzed.

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Journal title

volume 31  issue 12

pages  2068- 2076

publication date 2018-12-01

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