حکم اخذ وجه مازاد بر تعرفه توسط پزشکان (زیرمیزی) در مراکز دولتی از منظر فقه و حقوق

Background and aim: Among the most important challenges facing the patients and managers in health system is the issue of receiving additional charges known as “kickbacks”. Despite the fact that legislators have generally considered this act as illegal, there is a different judicial ruling because the nature of treatment contracts in private centers such as offices and public centers differs from each other. This article investigates the judicial ruling on receiving kickbacks in state centers. Method: This is a retrospective study based on extensive literature survey. Findings: Referring to some other evidence, some argue that the illegitimacy of bribery is only in legal cases and in non-legal cases such as medicine, it is permissible. Others, however, believe that in the issue of emergencies, based on common sense the person under pressure has agreed to such contract, it is considered as valid and cannot be regarded as ill-gotten or illegal money. Conclusion: From the judicial point of view, in these cases, the doctor becomes a party hired through the contract made by the hospitals or other public centers and since he has no direct financial relation with the patient, his receiving the kickbacks cannot be justified judicially or legally because he is employed by the government and is required to receive the amount of money stated in the contract. Therefore, taking any kickbacks is considered as ill-gotten money and as a result it is regarded illegal and unlawful. However, some of the jurists have allowed for it provided that the patient himself consents to paying additional money. It seems that a patient has no option but to consent to such terms because of the emergency situation he is in and such a ruling is null and void and it is still considered as illegal. Please cite this article as: Karimi N. Ruling of Extra-Tariff  Received by Doctors (Kickbacks) in State Medical Centers from Jurisprudence and Law Viewpoint. Iran J Med Law 2016; 10(37)