Lecture 7: May 4 7.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information
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چکیده
7.1.1 Definitions Definition An extensive game with perfect information 〈N,H, P, Ui〉 has the following components: • A set of N players • A set H of sequences (finite or infinite). each member of H is a history; each component of a history ia an action taken by a player. • P is the player function, P (h) being the player who takes an action after the history h. • Payoff function Ui, i ∈ N After any history h player P (h) chooses an action from the set A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}. The empty history is the starting point of the game.
منابع مشابه
Lecture Notes on Game Theory
1. Extensive form games with perfect information 3 1.1. Chess 3 1.2. Definition of extensive form games with perfect information 4 1.3. The ultimatum game 5 1.4. Equilibria 5 1.5. The centipede game 6 1.6. Subgames and subgame perfect equilibria 6 1.7. Backward induction, Kuhn’s Theorem and a proof of Zermelo’s Theorem 7 2. Strategic form games 10 2.1. Definition 10 2.2. Nash equilibria 10 2.3....
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