A solution set for fine games

نویسندگان

  • G. Xu
  • C. Hoede
  • H. Sun
چکیده

Bumb and Hoede have shown that a cooperative game can be split into two games, the reward game and the fine game, by considering the sign of quantities c v S in the c-diagram of the game. One can then define a solution x for the original game as x = x r − x f , where x r is a solution for the reward game and x f is a solution for the fine game. Due to the distinction of cooperation rewards and fines, for allocating the fines one may use another solution concept than for the rewards. In this paper, fine vectors are introduced and a solution mapping for fine games is defined. We discuss the structure and properties of this mapping and show how the solution set is related to the Shapley value, the core and the Weber set. We also characterize the mapping as the unique mapping satisfying axioms of Efficiency, Pseudo-symmetry, Dummy Player Property and Additivity.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005