Dynamics of Provision of Threshold Public Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
CIRANO Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du Ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams.
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