Dynamic Games with Perfect Awareness Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
I study dynamic games where players may be unaware of some fundamentals of the game itself, such as actions or players, and such unawareness may be lifted by other players’ actions during the play. Based on Li (2006a, 2006b), I propose a framework to deal with such games using standard tools of game theory. I construct examples to show that unawareness is distinctly different from assigning zero probability in games.
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