Computing Proper Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that a proper equilibrium of a matrix game can be found in polynomial time by solving a linear (in the number of pure strategies of the two players) number of linear programs of roughly the same dimensions as the standard linear programs describing the Nash equilibria of the game.
منابع مشابه
Computing Uniformly Optimal Strategies in Two-Player Stochastic Games
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