Bertrand - Edgeworth Equilibria in Finite Exchange Economies by Fabrizio Germano
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce a framework for analyzing Bertrand-Edgeworth equi-libria in nite Arrow-Debreu exchange economies. A key feature of the framework is the way trade takes place. There are two main stages. In the rst stage agents simultaneously choose prices and quantities of commodities they want to sell. In the second stage they enter the markets as buyers sequentially and choose only quantities of commodities they want to buy. We show that, under certain Lipschitz conditions on demands, the equilibria obtained are generally diierent from the Walrasian ones.
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