Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
نویسندگان
چکیده
In van Benthem [2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover arbitrary strategic games and many optimality notions. We distinguish between announcements of optimality and announcements of rationality.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1012.5173 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010