New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
نویسندگان
چکیده
Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design, • We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the combined social welfare-revenue performance of any mechanism in truly combinatorial auctions. • We put forward a new notion of implementation, much more general than the ones used so far, which we believe to be of independent interest. • We put forward a new resilient mechanism that, by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other, guarantees at least one half of our benchmark under a very general collusion model.
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Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
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