The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps

نویسندگان

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
  • Peter Sudhölter
چکیده

Homogeneous games were introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in the constantsum case. Peleg studied the kernel and the nucleolus within this framework. However, for the general nonconstant-sum case Ostmann invented the unique minimal representation, Rosenmiiller gave a second characterization and Sudhiilter discovered the “incidence vector”. Based on these results Peleg and Rosenmiiller treated several solution concepts for “games without steps”. The present paper treats the case of games “with steps”. It is shown that with a suitable version of a “truncated game” the nucleolus of a game is essentially the one obtained by truncating behind the “largest step”. As the truncated version has “no steps”, the case “with steps” is reduced to the one “without steps”, which is treated in the paper by Peleg and Rosenmiiller.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Discrete Applied Mathematics

دوره 50  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1994