Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes

نویسندگان

  • Mário R. Páscoa
  • Abdelkrim Seghir
چکیده

In the presence of utility penalties, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes. Harsh utility penalties may induce effective payments over collateral recollection values. In this event, loans can be larger than collateral costs and Ponzi schemes become possible.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 65  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009