1 The Error in the Error Theory *

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements. As a New Zealander, my earliest forays into metaethics drew me inexorably towards error theory, that characteristically antipodean view.1 (One might idly speculate that this tendency explains why another New Zealander, Arthur Prior, introduced into philosophical lore the proposition that all New Zealanders ought to be shot!) It seemed to me that John Mackie, a philosopher from ̳across the ditch‘, had got matters right in the notorious first chapter of his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [1977]; when people make moral assertions, they are ordinarily uttering falsehoods, because these assertions mistakenly suppose the instantiation of fantastical moral properties. But I am not any longer an error theorist, and I no longer believe that everyday moral discourse embodies a fundamental error. In this paper I explain why this is so, and where Mackie and those who follow him, like Richard Joyce [2001; 2006], go wrong. Error theory concurs with moral realism that moral claims aim to describe moral facts and properties, but it sides with antirealism in denying that there are any moral facts or properties there to be described. It is premised on two claims:2 * Author Posting. (c) Australasian Association of Philosophy, 2008. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the Australasian Association of Philosophy for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, January 2008. doi:10.1080/00048400802001921 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400802001921) 1 Many moral error theorists are not antipodeans (i.e. Australasians), of course. But we are overrepresented as well as prominent among the ranks: Mackie was Australian, and Richard Joyce, presently the most prominent representative, is New Zealand-raised. Besides my earlier self, there are also at least Charles Pigden (by adoption), Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, Caroline West, and Ian Hinckfuss. Contemporary nonantipodean error theorists include Richard Garner, Don Loeb, Mark Eli Kalderon (although he rejects the label), and Joseph Biehl. Many contemporary error theorists are also fictionalists, who suggest that even though our moral claims are false they may be worth retaining because useful. 2 Joyce helpfully emphasizes this in his writings on the error theory (e.g. his 2007).