AUTONOMY, MORAL WORTH, AND RIGHT: Kant on Obligatory Ends, Respect for Law, and Original Acquisition Prospectus of the Argument PART I: OBLIGATORY ENDS, MATERIAL PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICAL LAW IN KANT’S DOCTRINE OF MORALS

Chapter 1: Beginning with the Metaphysics of Morals’ systematic portrayal of reason’s universally legislative role with respect to duties of right and duties of virtue, I explain why Kant requires the concept of an end that is also a duty if the distinction that he draws between juridical and ethical lawgiving is to ground the basic architectonic setup of his overall doctrine of morals, i.e., its division into a doctrine of right and a doctrine of virtue. Then, after explicating this a priori concept of an objectively necessary end of morally practical reason, I treat Kant’s account of one’s own perfection and others’ happiness as the only two promotable ends of action that are eligible to be ends that are also duties, i.e., intrinsically obligatory ends.