Bargaining with a Claims Structure: Possible Solutions to a Talmudic Division Problem

نویسنده

  • Barry O’Neill
چکیده

Abstract: A man wants to sell his land, but his two wives hold claims to acquire it in case of a divorce or his death. The first wife writes the buyer giving up her claim and the sale goes through. After the husband dies, the second wife points out that she did not relinquish her claim and she seizes the land from the buyer. Then the first wife takes the land from the second wife, arguing that she has priority over the second and gave up her right only with respect to the buyer. The buyer then seizes the land from the first wife, and so on. The Talmud states that they compromise but does not give their shares. The situation can be construed as a bargaining game with non-transferable utility, assuming that side payments can be seized just like the land, or as a sequential-offer bargaining game. For a reasonable characteristic function the NTU-value of Harsanyi seems most intuitive. A man wants to sell his land, but his two wives hold claims to acquire it in case of a divorce or his death. The first wife writes the buyer giving up her claim and the sale goes through. After the husband dies, the second wife points out that she did not relinquish her claim and she seizes the land from the buyer. Then the first wife takes the land from the second wife, arguing that she has priority over the second and gave up her right only with respect to the buyer. The buyer then seizes the land from the first wife, and so on. The Talmud states that they compromise but does not give their shares. The situation can be construed as a bargaining game with non-transferable utility, assuming that side payments can be seized just like the land, or as a sequential-offer bargaining game. For a reasonable characteristic function the NTU-value of Harsanyi seems most intuitive. Acknowledgement: The author thanks Renee Bowen, Dov Samet, Catherine Ross, David Schmeidler and Muhamet Yildiz for helpful discussions, and is grateful for support from the Leon Levy Foundation and the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that...

متن کامل

Fair division in unanimity bargaining with subjective claims

In an experiment on a subjective claims problem we compare three unanimity bargaining procedures – the Demand, the Offer and the Exit variant – in terms of fairness and efficiency. To assess the fairness of the allocations obtained by these procedures, we evaluate them from a partial point of view using stakeholders’ subjective evaluations of claims as elicited in a hypothetical fairness questi...

متن کامل

NETWORKS OF RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: A TALMUDIC EXAMPLE By

Many disputes involve conflicts of rights. A common view is that rights cannot really be in conflict so one of those being claimed must be a mistake. This idea leads to extreme outcomes that cut some parties out. Many studies have investigated how to choose a compromise among rights but they have focus on situations where the incompatibility comes from the degrees of the claims, as when, for ex...

متن کامل

Measuring the efficiency of Iranian electricity distribution companies, a combined approach to bargaining game with DEA

 Many models have been proposed for measuring performance of business agencies up to now. The goal of this research is providing a new approach for evaluation and measurement of efficiencies of national power distribution companies. This approach is provided as a combination of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Game Theory for evaluation of decision-making units by a large scale of actions. I...

متن کامل

Compelling a Divorce? Early Talmudic Roots of Coercion in a Case of Moredet

The purpose of this paper is to expose the deep roots of coercion of a get in the case of the moredet (the rebellious wife) in tannaitic and amoraic sources. The relevant Talmudic sources will be discussed and interpreted. It is in the very nature of this kind of source that alternative interpretations are possible, which in our case differ inter alia as regards coercion. However, the interpret...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009