Setting limits on analogy : Why conceptual combination is not structural alignment

Structure-mapping or structural alignment is fast emerging as a unifying principle for a variety of different phenomena; including analogy, metaphor, similarity and conceptual combination. In this paper, we argue that it is inappropriate to extend this idea to conceptual combination, as has been done in dual-process theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, in press). There are theoretical and empirical grounds for taking up this position. We propose an alternative account based on the constraint press), which views the interpretation of concept combinations as one of satisfying multiple constraints of diagnosticity, plausibility and informativeness. This theory, which we would like to advertise as being the truth, does not use structure-mapping. We conclude by promoting the idea that rather than applying analogy's constraints to conceptual combination, it may be more productive to consider how conceptual combination's constraints might apply to analogy.