Social Selection and the Evolution of Animal Signals.

Social selection is presented here as a parallel theory to sexual selection and is defined as a selective force that occurs when individuals change their own social behaviors, responding to signals sent by conspecifics in a way to influence the other individuals' fitness. I analyze the joint evolution of a social signal and behavioral responsiveness to the signal by a quantitative-genetic model. The equilibria of average phenotypes maintained by a balance of social selection and natural selection and their stability are examined for two alternative assumptions on behavioral responsiveness, neutral and adaptive. When behavioral responsiveness is neutral on fitness, a rapid evolution by runaway selection occurs only with enough genetic covariance between the signal and responsiveness. The condition for rapid evolution also depends on natural selection and the number of interacting individuals. When signals convey some information on signalers (e.g., fighting ability), behavioral responsiveness is adaptive such that a receiver's fitness is also influenced by the signal. Here there is a single point of equilibrium. The equilibrium point and its stability do not depend on the genetic correlation. The condition needed for evolution is that the signal is beneficial for receivers, which results from reliability of the signal. Frequency-dependent selection on responsiveness has almost no influence on the equilibrium and the rate of evolution.