The Individuality and Sociality of Action in Kant. On the Kingdom of Ends as a Relational Theory of Action

Introduction Until very recently, the standard approach in action theory seemed to restrict its focus to individuals, as if what goes on in the agent or what she brings about in the world provided the essentials to understand agency. In the past few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in the social character of human action or, as is now termed, the ‘sociality of action’. This perspective on human action stems mainly from the contemporary interpretation of Hegel. A theory of the sociality of action is an account of human agency that understands both particular actions and agenthood itself as essentially social phenomena, the former because human actions are always embedded in social and cultural contexts, and the latter because being an agent is to be understood as a kind of social status or achievement. At first glance, it seems that in Kant’s philosophical system there is no place for either of those forms of the sociality of action, and for a number of reasons: First, he argues for his views about ethics and human action primarily from the perspective of the individual agent. Second, his central ethical claim –that human agents are morally autonomous– means that reason is able to determine the will by itself, with absolute independence of any influence or constraint, be it external or internal to the agent. Third, his writings show little interest in exploring the implications that the social character of human beings might have for our understanding of the very concept of agency. Fourth, his conception of agency as a causal power to effect change in the world appeals to a sharp distinction between two perspectives from which we can understand human action –as either subject to, or else free from, the causal laws of nature– in a way that seems to prevent him from giving a unified account of such agency as something that is at the same time free and yet also responsive to its social or cultural context. Despite all this, however, a closer examination of this boldly individualistic understanding of human action is precisely what is required in order for us to bring to light the unavoidably social dimension of human action in the clearest way. For, in formulating his practical