More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature
نویسندگان
چکیده
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
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