Adam Smith’s “sympathetic Impartiality” and Universality*

I reconstruct here the implicit rationale of Smith’s ethical system, which unites in a single and consistent theory the most valuable features of both ancient virtue ethics and modern deontology. I propose that Smith could do this because of his approach to what I call “sympathetic impartiality”, and the pretension of universality that arises from it. In Smith’s theory, sentiments are moralized through the impartial spectator procedure which, willingly or not, changes the moral axis from emotivism to practical reason. Unlike rationalistic philosophers, Adam Smith did not explicitly articulate a rational structure to justify everyday talk and moral practice, nor did he use theoretical reasons to support these judgments. On the contrary, starting from empirical observations, he gave realistic and commonsensical explanations of how moral norms and judgments arise from the natural drives of human beings. However, I believe that the reconstruction of the rational structure underlying Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is possible, and hence that we can unveil part of the implicit justification of this ethical system. Obviously I am not claiming that Smith intended or was even aware of this hypothetical theoretical framing I here propose, yet his insightful account of the psychological and anthropological basis for moral * Paper delivered at the American Philosophical Association Meeting held in 2004. I am most indebted to Samuel Fleischaker, Douglas Den Uyl and Eric Schleisser’s comments on the draft of this paper. ** Doctora en Filosofía (Universidad de Navarra). Profesora de la Facultad de Filosofía (Pontificia Universidad Católica, Santiago, Chile). Email: [email protected] Revista de Instituciones, Ideas y Mercados No 52 | Mayo 2010 | pp. 178-195 | ISSN 1852-5970