Why We Would Not Understand a Talking Lion

One of the mostperplexing passages in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations occurs in Part Two where it is asserted: "Ifa lion could talk, we could not understand him."[ This remark has been interpreted as anything from a mere comment concerning our conception of a lion to an empirical claim regarding the communicative capacities of lions and nonhumans in general to a highly speculative assertion as to the possibility of there being radical incommensurability among language-users.2 Whichever interpretation is correct, Wittgenstein's claim, if true, does not bode well for those of us who would like to assign rights to animals. Since the assignment of rights typically proceeds on the determination of interests, should it tum out that we would not understand aninlals in spite of theirpossessing language, then surely the whole task ofassigning rights to animals is hopeless. My purpose is to clarify the meaning ofWittgenstein's statement and to determine whether what he says is true. I shall argue that what has emerged as the received view on the remark is wrong. The received view (as I shall call it) interprets the remark as expressing Wittgenstein's belief that there could exist "forms of life" so different in nature that their