Using Simulation to Model Time Utilization of Army Recruiters

The Army has been an all-volunteer force since 1 July 1973 when the draft was finally discontinued due to the controversy surrounding the Vietnam War. According to Simpson (1994), the last draftee entered basic training in June 1973. In FY 1997, for only the second time since its conversion to an all-volunteer force, the Army came very close to not meeting its annual recruiting goal of 89,700 new recruits. This situation reflects a recent trend in which fewer young people are choosing an Army career, opting instead to look for positions in the civilian workforce. Several factors contribute to the difficulties that are inhibiting the Army’s ability to meet the requirements of its force projections. For one, the rather large increase of 26,700 in the recruiting quota from 1995 to 1997 has not been offset by a corresponding increase in personnel authorizations at the stations. This has in turn undermined the Army’s ability to meet its mission goals (Kennedy, 1997). Another has been the national attention focused on recruiting personnel over allegations of behavioral impropriety in the stations, basic training camps and on the job. Image problems, and even the strength of the national economy, have likewise contributed to the relative sparseness of the recruit pool. The current methods and capabilities of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), while sufficient during previous recruiting years, have proven unsatisfactory to meet these challenges. USAREC has not substantially increased its personnel at the station level, and consequently, existing recruiters have to cope with increasing mission demands. Thus, as has been the theme in the civilian workplace during the past decade, the Army must consider changes that will allow it to “do more with less.” This, in turn, implies that greater efficiencies in time management must be introduced at the station level. To this end, the Army commissioned the Air Force Institute of Technology in the summer of 1997 to conduct a simulation study of station-level activities in the Third Brigade of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). The purpose of this study was not to suggest a strategic solution to the leadership of the Army, but rather to build a tool that would enable others to study the effects of changes at the recruiting station level. Our team responded with a comprehensive program of recruiting station visits for process study and data gathering, which was followed by a computer simulation development phase. Arguably the most important six months of the study was occupied by data gathering excursions to stations in the Dayton, Ohio and Cincinnati, Ohio/Covington, Kentucky areas. This sampling of locations permitted the formulation of a consensus view of the recruiting process that provided the framework for the digital model. Upon completion of the study, we provided the Army with a tactical-level model that analysts could use to study the impacts of changes made by Army leadership. The level of detail required for this task could not have been captured were it not for the input of the many recruiters that we interviewed. They assisted with the validation of process flows and model output and provided insight into conditions at the stations. It was recognized early on that, to successfully meet the goals of the study, we needed to focus primarily on recruiter-level issues-in effect, to see recruiting from the perspective of the recruiter at the station. Since recruiters are ultimately responsible for putting official policy into practice, the recruiter must be considered a critical element of any move to counteract the economic and social pressures on the national recruiting effort.