Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules

This paper examines different ways of measuring power and the use of these measures in the context of the European Union. The paper deals with classical power indices of co-operative games and more recent non-cooperative a priori measures. Special emphasis of the paper is in inter-institutional balance of power, Nice reforms and eastern enlargement. ∗Earlier version and parts of this paper have been presented at European Economy Group III International Conference on European Economy at Complutense University of Madrid and Finnish-Estonian conference on eastern enlargement of the EU at Tallin Technical University. I thank the participants of these events for useful comments. ∗∗Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, ETLA, CEPR and CESifo, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, 20500 Turku, Finland. Tel. +358-2-4814337, fax: 358-2-4814302, e-mail: [email protected]