Coalition Formation and Stability
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation game in which every player's payo® depends only on the members of her coalition. We provide three conditions under which the core of such games is non-empty. The three properties identi ̄ed are called Union Responsiveness, Intersection Responsiveness, and Essentiality. All three are restrictions on individuals' preferences and stable allocations always exist under each of them.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 27 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006