Comments on Vagueness Through Definitions

Most theories of vagueness characterize the phenomenon by reference to the extension of our concepts: the vagueness of a predicate is usually described by the existence of borderline cases, namely cases for which the predicate neither clearly applies, nor clearly fails to apply. A lot remains to be said about the relation between the existence of borderline cases and structural aspects of the meaning of vague predicates from which that existence could analytically derive. The first originality of Michael Freund’s approach to vagueness in this regard is the connection sought between vagueness and the intension or definition of our concepts. What Freund examines in his paper are the defining features of complex concepts, namely the various criteria that enter into the decision of whether or not to apply the concept to a given object. A second and related originality of Freund’s account is the emphasis put on multidimensionality. Vagueness is generally looked at from a one-dimensional perspective. For instance, when discussing the vagueness of gradable adjectives such as “bald”, “tall” or “young”, we generally consider a single dimension of comparison for whether or not an object should fall under the concept. For “bald”, membership is typically presented as a function of the number of hairs, for “tall”, as a function of height, for “young”, as a function of age. However, vagueness is also characteristic of complex concepts expressed by common nouns, such as “car”, “bird” or “vegetable”. In order to determine whether an object is a car or not, we cannot rely on a unique nor obvious scale of comparison. Rather, as stressed by Freund in his account, the application of such concepts to particular objects involves the consideration of distinct and separable features that can vary independently. A very important insight of Freund’s contribution to this volume is that one source of vagueness lies in the existence of multiple respects of comparison, at least for an important class of predicates, namely definable predicates expressible by common nouns. For instance, when we apply a concept such as “car” to an object, there are several defining features that we need to check for, but also that we need to weigh against each other. From Freund’s account, both aspects are responsible for vagueness. An object may instantiate more of the defining features of a concept than some other object. But possibly,