Core on Fuzzy Interval Cooperative Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In 2011, Mallozzi et al. [Fuzzy Sets and Systems 165(2011) 98105] introduced a core-like concept (called F-core) and a balanced-like condition for games in which the worth of any coalition is given by means of a fuzzy interval. They proved that a balanced-like condition is necessary but not sufficient enough to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. In this paper, we study deeply on this problem and, show the necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. We also introduce a useful sufficient condition, average monotonic-like condition, to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. Mathematics Subject Classification: 26E50
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