Making sense of dissensus A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in International Relations Theory

In social science (and beyond of course), disagreement and debate are ubiquitous. Within IR there was for example the interparadigm debate and, more recently, the controversy between positivists and critical realists. Scholars commonly feel they need to take stance in these discussions, but often lack understanding of the exact nature of the disagreement they are having. For what exactly is at stake when critical realists target positivism, or when the neorealist position is undermined? How to deal with the plurality of explanations; how to make sense of dissensus? Graham Allison’s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. We will show how the introduction of epistemic interests can both narrow down the number of available explanations and offer a way to make sense of dissensus.