Algorithms for Coalitional Games

نویسندگان

  • Helena Keinänen
  • Hannu Salonen
چکیده

Coalitional games are studied extensively in economics and computer science. They have recently shown to be a useful formalism and are applicable to a wide range of domains from electronic commerce to trade and negotiation systems. Key topics in coalitional games include both deciding the stability of given coalitions and calculating representative or all stable coalitions. However, typically the number of possible outcomes in coalitional games grows exponentially in the number of players involved. Thus, usually finding stable or optimal outcomes among all possible outcomes of a coalitional game is a challenging combinatorial task. The main objective of this research is to develop practically efficient algorithms for coalitional games with a large number of players. In particular, the research in the thesis focuses on hedonic coalitional games. As the main results, the thesis introduces new methods for finding a core stable coalition structure, calculating the set of all Nash stable coalition structures, and checking the core membership of a given hedonic game solution. In addition, the thesis presents a new technique to maximize social welfare in coalitional games represented as characteristic function

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تاریخ انتشار 2011