Macaque Mirror Neurons: Detecting Intentions Intentionally?

Here are three mutually incompatible propositions: 1. To understand the intentional actions of others requires knowledge of the intentional states (i.e., beliefs and desires) which (rationally) motivated those actions. 2. Monkeys do not have knowledge of the intentional states (beliefs and desires) motivating the actions of others. 3. Monkeys understand the intentional actions of other monkeys. Proposition 1 is based on the traditional philosophical analysis of intentional action and a commonsense view about understanding-if I don't know what (rationally) motivates your action, then I don't really understand the action. Proposition 2 represents a consensus view among primatologists about absence of higher-order "theory of mind" capacities in monkeys. Proposition 3 reflects a common interpretation of the functions of so-called "mirror neurons" in the ventral premotor (F5) cortex of macaque monkeys (e.