On Replaceability

Peter Singer has shown how the principle of utility, which enjoins us (roughly) to maximize to balance of nonmoral good over nonmoral evil, justifies 'humane' treatment of ani­­­ mals. 1 An excellent case against fac­­­ tory farming, blood sports, and cur­­­ rent methods of an imal laboratory experimentation has been made on utilitarian grounds. However, must a utilitarian be opposed to all exploita­­­ tion of animals' lives for human pleas­­­ u re or profit? Not according to the 'replacement argument,' which tells us that: 1. We ought to maximize util ­­­ ity (i.e., to maximize the balance of nonmoral good over nonmoral evil). 2. Utility would be maximized if one were to use an ani­­­ mal and kill it (for food or research or anything else) provided that the following conditions are met: (a)· the life of the animal is on balance a Iife worth living, (b) the animal otherwise would have no life at all (would not exist), (c) the sufferi ng of the animal and those close to it as a result of such use and disposal is elimi­­­ nated or minimized, and (d) the· animal will be replaced, at or after death, by another animal for whom conditions (a), (b), (c), and (d) hold. 3. Therefore, we ought to use and kill animals provided that conditions (a) (d) are met. 2