The justice and therapeutic promise of science-based research on criminal evil.

Forensic science research intended to standardize the distinction of the worst criminal behavior, specifically the Depravity Scale, has been the topic of academic and public discussion in the Journal and elsewhere. Some early impressions have been published without substantive attention to the goals of this research and the application of the results. In a recent article in the Journal, for example, James Knoll argued, “Evil can never be scientifically defined because it is an illusory moral concept,” adding, “it does not exist in nature” (Ref. 8, p 105). It is my contention that evil does exist in nature. In fact, evil exists in the very law with which advanced societies judge the actions of man. In the United States, different state and federal sentencing guidelines distinguish among heinous, atrocious, cruel, vile, horribly inhuman, and, yes, evil criminal behavior. Such designations elevate culpability in a variety of offenses, ranging from murder to burglary, and affect parole eligibility in states as diverse as California and Louisiana. Beyond criminal law, tort law in all 50 states distinguishes between extreme and outrageous behavior as a basis for deciding liability incurred by intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lawsuits brought because of intentional infliction of emotional distress involve events that have occurred in everyday interaction, when no criminal law may have been broken. At the heart of the legal distinction of the severity of criminal depravity is the recognition that some crimes are the worst of the worst. The constitutionality of distinguishing the level of heinousness in crimes has been repeatedly upheld by the United States Supreme Court. The controversy surrounding the legal characterization of evil is therefore not whether depravity exists or whether it is constitutional for such distinctions to be made, but how depravity is distinguished. The law has tried to establish boundaries and guidelines. In the case of heinous and depraved crimes, the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia acknowledged the difficulty confronting jurors who must decide penalties in the worst of crimes. How can a juror who has had no experience in handing down sentences for crimes decide that a particular murder is horrible and inhuman? In that vein, the United States Supreme Court in Gregg encouraged the development of standards, based on societal attitudes, to inform the court and to alleviate the challenge of jury inexperience: