Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy1
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (PérezCastrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents. JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.
منابع مشابه
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (PérezCastrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents. JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.
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