Conditions for Cournot Cooperation in Large Markets: A Reinterpretation
نویسنده
چکیده
Lambson (1984) has derived the restrictive conditions under which cooperation may be maintained in a Cournot market with a large numbers of firms. He does this in the context of a repeated game, where a trigger strategy with infinite Nash reversion is the enforcement mechanism. In this paper, Lambson's (1984) result is reinterpreted, and it is argued that cooperation among a large number of Cournot firms may be possible under conditions which are relevant for antitrust policy. *I would like to thank John Conlon for helpful discussions of the model.
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