"Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings

A well known issue in Western Philosophy is that of "freedom of the will": whether, how and in what sense human beings have genuine freedom of action in the context of a broad range of external and internal conditioning factors. Any system of ethics also assumes that humans have, in some sense, a freedom to choose between different courses of action. Buddhist ethics is no different in this—but how is freedom of action to be made sense of in a system that sees human beings as an interacting cluster of conditioned and conditioning processes, with no substantial I-agent either within or beyond this cluster? This article explores this issue within Theravāda Buddhism, and concludes that the view of this tradition on the issue is a "compatibilist" middle way between seeing a person's actions as completely rigidly determined, and seeing them as totally and unconditionally free, with a variety of factors acting to bring, and Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 36 increase, the element of freedom that humans have. In a different way, if a person is wrongly seen as an essential, permanent Self, it is an "undetermined question" as to whether "a person's acts of will are determined" or "a person's acts of will are free." If there is no essential person-entity, "it" can not be said to be either determined or free. Buddhist ethics, as with other aspects of Buddhist practice, assume that people are in principle capable of choosing between different courses of action, and that they should be held responsible for their actions. Indeed the doctrine of karma is based on the idea that intentional actions: a) have a shaping effect on a person's character and destiny; b) can change for the better (or worse); and c) that this improvement can be consciously chosen. More generally, much human discourse assumes that people are responsible for their actions and can be held to account for them, which implies that they were in some sense free to do otherwise. This is assumed in courts of law—unless it can be proved that the defendant was acting under duress, such as a threat of violence, or was out of his or her mind. It is also assumed in the praise and blame that we give in moral discourse. The Problem of Freedom "Freedom of the will" is a topic upon which Western Philosophy has spent much thought. While moral discourse and its notion of responsibility assume some kind of freedom to act, this notion is not without its difficulties. People's choices, decisions and intentions, which are 37 Journal of Buddhist Ethics expressions of will, and even the desires and aspirations which feed into these, are clearly under a range of influences: • Biological influences: one's genes, but also the effect of illness, tiredness, or drugs • Social influences: from parents, peers, education, and the media, especially advertising • Personal history: one's life events • General history: the times in which one lives • Psychological influences: fears, complexes, inclinations, strengths and weaknesses, and mental illness Thus one's choices, however "free" they may feel, are made under the influence of a range of conditioning factors or constraints. In the light of the multiple factors conditioning people's actions, a "determinist" philosopher is one who denies that people have genuinely free will: all our actions and choices are determined by causes. Non-determinists emphasize human freedom. A strong example was the French Existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80), who held that we are radically free: we only let ourselves be determined by a variety of influences because we deny or overlook our radical freedom, which he saw as based on the uncaused, spontaneous nature of consciousness (Medhidhammaporn 1995:6171). Whatever circumstances we are faced with as a human being, we can say "no" to them and choose a different way, or at least choose our response to them. For example, the man Sartre condemns for having totally identified with the role of being "a waiter" has the freedom to act in a more authentic way—but he lets himself be molded by the role (Sartre 1958:59-60). Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 38 Another philosophical position is some form of "compatibilism," which accepts that all human actions and choices have causes—for them to be totally uninfluenced by anything would make them random events, not free—but as long as the causes include one's desires and conscious rational deliberations, one is acting "freely." However, when they are totally determined by causes outside one's control, they are un-free. As explained by Asaf Federman (2007:6): Compatibilists do not see freedom as the ultimate control of will over action, rather they explain it as the ability to execute action according to psychological dispositions like will, wish, and desire....Daniel Dennett argues that freedom from causality is not only impossible but also unnecessary. He suggests that what makes us free is our ability to anticipate future events and then act in order to avoid undesired consequences. He concludes that this type of freedom accounts for all that matters: choice, morality, responsibility and self-improvement. One important aspect of his suggestions is that this kind of free will can operate only in a deterministic reality where future events can be predicted. It cannot possibly exist in a non-deterministic reality where events happen with no apparent reason or order. For the materialist Dennett (1993, 2003), the ability to predict is limited, but "in the human case it is developed to a very high degree which enables us the freedom to act according to what we think is good" (Federman, 2007:7). As our reason and desires, along with other mental processes, some unconscious, are crucial to the issue of freedom of action, some, including Dennett, emphasize that talk of "freedom of the will" is too narrow a label for the issue, while remaining a useful shorthand: the issue is whether a person can act freely, in line with his/her desires and rational assessment of 39 Journal of Buddhist Ethics these and the world. This emphasis is seen in points 4 and 5 of Federman's summary of the components of Dennett's notion of free will (2007:7): (1) Free will does not originate from God (2) Free will does not belong in a separate non-physical substance (like a soul) (3) Free will is not an ultimate controller that resides in the centre of being. (4) Free will should be seen more as a property of the entire individual, rather than a function of a neurological control room. In other words, free will does not happen at a particular place (in the brain) or at a particular moment (in time t). (5) Free will is an expression of many parallel, unconscious and lowlevel processes. It is not a single process that has an ultimate ruling power. (6) Free will evolves. It comes in different degrees and strengths. (7) Free will depends on information available to the agent. (8) Free will does not contradict determinism or causality. Freedom of Will in Buddhism As Luis Gomez says, Indian interest in the problem of freedom of the will has been "rather sporadic" compared to Western discussion of the subject (1975:81). Buddhism has certainly been interested in action, will and freedom, so what does it say or imply on this issue of how responsibility and self-directed change are possible? In this paper, the perspective of Theravāda Buddhism on this issue is explored. Buddhist texts certainly emphasize that people are individually responsible for the actions that they do. This is shown from M.III.179-180, Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 40 where Yama, king of the dead, reprimands an evil-doer who has arrived in hell, saying that a certain deed was done by him, and not by any friend or relative, so that he must experience its karmic result. This passage need not imply that such a past action was done by a substantial, still existent Self— which Buddhism does not accept, but only that it was done by an earlier portion of the "continuity" of mental and physical processes that the person now is: not by any other continuity (see Harvey 1995:66-68). He, no one else, is responsible. Moreover, the Buddha opposed the fatalistic doctrine of the Ājīvikas, who held that people are not responsible for their actions as they are driven by the external force of niyati, or "destiny": people's karma or action is a passive effect of this, over which they have no control (D.I.53). When someone said to the Buddha that there was no such thing as self-agency (atta-kāra), he replied by emphasizing that there is an "element of initiating (ārabbha-dhātu)" in people—i.e., some kind of ability to choose—which allows them to initiate and direct actions such as bodily movements (A.III.337-338). The Buddha opposed determinism as he saw it as a doctrine that froze a person's will to overcome unwholesome/unskillful (akusala) actions and develop wholesome/skilful (kusala) ones. Modern scholars have characterized the Buddhist position on the issue of freedom of the will in different ways. Federman holds that Buddhism promotes: a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some key features with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. ... the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body. (2007:1) 41 Journal of Buddhist Ethics As in modern compatibilism, the Buddhist free will is not contrasted with causality itself, but with coercion and compulsion. While the Western tradition tends to emphasize external compulsion and social freedom, Buddhist doctrine tends to emphasize internal compulsions and psychological freedom. (2007:16) This last point is certainly pertinent: when "freely" acting in accord with one's desires and reasoning, one's freedom may be compromised by the fact that one sometimes has desires one wishes one did not have, yet may still act on them, and by the fact that one's reasoning may be false, biased or strongly influenced by social and cultural conditioning. Federman continues by saying that Buddhism: affirms that people can, and indeed should, take responsibility over their actions. Choosing right action is not derived from a supernatural or super-causal origin. It is derived from wise contemplation over the possible consequences. This wisdom enables freedom, and is a faculty that can be developed. Therefore, free will is the ability to act wisely in a deterministic universe: where actions yield results. What limits freedom is not causality itself (karma or determinism), but thought patterns, mental-compulsion, and habitual behaviour. (2007:16-17) Paul Griffiths perhaps reads Buddhism as having a more straightforward doctrine of free will. For him, karma may determine certain things such as one's "mental capacity ... the moral character of one's parents," but: within these parameters it is still possible to act well or badly, to make the best possible use of what has been determined for one or make things worse by bowing to one’s limitations. So Buddhist theory is certainly not strict determinism. (1982:287) Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 42 Charles Goodman, on the other hand, sees Buddhism as a form of strict/hard determinism: The Buddhist traditions offers a way ...to give up both the theory and practice of moral responsibility, and thereby to escape the need to believe in the indefensible notion of free will. (2002:361) Against what Griffiths says above, Goodman argues (363): If the parameters are all determined by karma, then people’s actions must be caused by the parameters, by something else, or nothing. If actions are caused by the parameters, then they are determined. If they are caused by nothing, they are utterly random, and therefore not free. If they are caused by something else, this something else must either be the self or something other than the self. If the something else is not the self, then either determinism or randomness will result. But the something else can’t be the self, because, according to Buddhists, there is no self. Therefore Griffiths’s interpretation is untenable. Note that in this reasoning, he offers no middle ground between "determinism and randomness." He thus allows no room for any form of compatibilism. In arguing for a determinist reading of Buddhism, he discusses the Buddha's objection to the fatalist view of Makkhali Gosāla (D.I.53-54), as described at M.I.407: There is no cause (hetu) or condition (paccayo) for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified 43 Journal of Buddhist Ethics without cause or condition. There is no power (balaṃ), no energy (viriyaṃ), no manly strength (purisa-tthāmo), no manly endurance (purisa-parakkamo). All beings, all living things, all creatures, all souls (jīvā) are without mastery, power and energy; molded by destiny, circumstance, and nature (niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā), they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes (of humans; cf A.III.383-84). Goodman seeks to argue that the Buddha's objection to this view does not mean he would have also disagreed with modern hard determinism. He comments that the view actually conflicts with this determinism, as it denies that defilement and purification have a cause (365). However, this is to misread the passage. Its claim is clearly that these have no cause within the current control of a person, as these and their actions are "molded by destiny, circumstance, and nature," which surely are kinds of causes. He also points out that, unlike the Indian fatalists, determinists don't deny that human actions have causal efficacy or that they can promote a person's welfare; it is just that they see the "choices" behind the actions as themselves determined and unfree (365-366). That said, it seems clear that the Buddha would have objected both to a denial of a person having "mastery, power and energy" and a denial that they have them, but have no control over them. Either way, they could not effectively choose to act so as to improve their conduct. Goodman holds (359) that: Western thinkers who have denied the reality of free will have continued to apply notions of moral responsibility in their own lives. Their practice is thus inescapably inconsistent with their theory. By drawing on Buddhist ideas, however, it is possible to develop a view on which perfect people do not ascribe moral responsibility. Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 44 However, even Goodman himself cannot abandon the assumption of moral responsibility. In citing Buddhist texts that praise non-anger, he is citing texts that say such things as "you should train thus" in developing lovingkindness (M.I.123). "Should" is a kind of moral appeal, implying some kind of moral agency and responsibility. Moreover, he says (370), that: in Buddhism, rational thought can be part of a process that leads people to turn against the way of life they know, and to seek spiritual values instead of worldly ones... To live the best kind of life, a Buddhist must transform the functions of his mind. In the phrases that I have underlined, Goodman is assuming that people have some kind of freedom to change the way they act. So much for the views of others, which help alert us to some of the issues. In my following review "freedom of the will" and its possible basis within a (Theravāda) Buddhist context, I will organize the discussion under several heads: (1) How does Buddhism regard madness? (2) How does Buddhism regard social and biological conditioning? (3) In the Buddhist perspective, is past karma seen to limit a person's present freedom of action? (4) Given that Buddhism does not accept a permanent Self, does this undermine the possibility of freedom? (5) As Buddhism sees a person as an interacting complex of conditioned mental and physical processes—the doctrine of Conditioned Arising or Dependent Origination (paṭicca-samuppāda)— how might "freedom of the will" be seen to arise in this complex of conditioned processes? 45 Journal of Buddhist Ethics (6) In particular, how is willing affected by spiritual ignorance, the quality of attention, and the basic radiant purity of the mind? (7) What is the relevance of the Buddhist concept of spiritual freedom? Madness and Related States In the monastic code, a monk who breaks a monastic rule when mad is not seen to commit an offence (Vin.IV.125). The Milindapañha discusses the case of a Jātaka story (J.III.514-519) where the Bodhisattva, as an ascetic, sacrifices (or almost does?) many animals when a king says that he can marry his beautiful daughter if he does so (Miln.220). The Miln. says that this was an action done when he was "out of his mind with passion, not when he was thinking of what he was doing (rāga-vasena visaññinā, no sañcetanena)." The action was not in accordance with his nature for he was "unhinged (khittacitto), impassioned. It was when he was out of his mind, thoroughly confused and agitated that, with thoughts confused, in a turmoil and disturbed," like a madman. Thus it is said that: Evil done by one who is unhinged, sire, is not of great blame here and now, nor is it so in respect of its ripening in a future state. ... there is no punishment for a madman’s crime, therefore there is no defect in what was done by a madman, he is pardonable (221). That is, the actions of a madman are seen as blameless, while actions done when impassioned are of little blame—though getting into such a state can be held to be blameworthy. Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 46 Social and Biological Conditioning Buddhism accepts that one's social environment can have a good or ill influence on the actions one chooses to perform. It emphasizes that one should choose one's friends wisely, as they can lead one astray or support one in good actions. Bad rulers can set a bad example that many in their realm then follow (A.II.74-76). There is also the idea that history goes through cycles (over huge timespans) when people's behavior generally deteriorates or improves. This can be seen in the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta (D.III.58-79). This tells of a line of past ideal rulers known as Cakkavattis (Universal Emperors). Their tradition was one of compassionate and just rule—until a new emperor neglected to look after the less well off. Consequently, poverty became widespread, such that in time someone stole, society having been previously crime-free. When brought before the emperor, he explained that he stole due to his poverty: so the emperor gave him wealth. Not surprisingly, this encouraged others to steal; until the emperor tried to put a stop to it by executing a thief. Consequently, thieves then armed themselves to avoid arrest and killed witnesses. Others, even if caught, lied about their activities (D.III. 6567). This then led on to other forms of moral decline in society. That is, social conditions can develop in such a way as to influence the behavior of most people. People are influenced by the times they live in. In times of war or famine, especially where the norms of normal civilized society break down, perhaps due to a perverse ideology, as under the Nazis, people's behavior takes a marked turn for the worst. Extreme circumstances encourage extreme behavior. It is for such reasons that Buddhism emphasizes the responsibility of a good Buddhist ruler to 47 Journal of Buddhist Ethics encourage wholesome views and behavior and seek to ensure that poverty is absent in society (D.I.134-136; see Harvey 2000:198); for poverty encourages theft and disorder, and is not a good basis for a moral life. Yet it would not be held that, because poverty makes theft more likely, it actually excuses anyone in particular acts of theft—though it might be seen as a mitigating factor. What of the influence of biology? Clearly, humans are a particular kind of physical being with certain needs, and this shapes the kind of actions people are able to do and tend to do—though they can and do choose to be celibate (not follow sexual desires) and to fast (e.g., Buddhist monks and nuns do not eat after noon). What of the influence of genes? While the idea did not exist in the pre-modern era, contemporary Buddhists are able to say that, as one gets one's genes from one's parents, and one gets one's parents from one's past karma, then any genetic influence on character, and thence behavior, is itself a mode of karmic influence. The Workings of Karma Karma (Pali kamma, Sanskrit karma) literally means "action," but in a religiophilosophical sense, in Buddhism, it is seen as the volition, or act of will behind any action: "It is will (cetanā), O monks, that I call karma; having willed, one acts through body, speech or mind" (A.III.415). This means that only intentional actions are regarded as having karmic results or "fruits" (kamma-vipāka or kamma-phala). The kind of results attributed to karma include one's form of rebirth, body, social class at birth, general character, and crucial good and bad things that happen to one (Harvey 1990:39; 2000:15-16). Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 48 The arising of certain kinds of results from certain kinds of action is seen as a kind of natural law which is part of the fabric of existence. The working of karma is seen as one aspect of the general principle of Conditioned Arising. In the most common application of this principle, the twelvefold chain of Conditioned Arising, moreover, karma is equivalent to the second link, "constructing activities" (the saṅkhāras), for the most important of these is will, the others being planning and having a latent tendency for something. The constructing activities are karmically negative or positive volitions put into effect through body, speech or mind (D.III.217, S.II.39-40, S.II.4). At the end of a life, karma provides the parameters within which the next rebirth is found: karma is the field, consciousness is the seed, craving is the moisture: for beings hindered by spiritual ignorance, fettered by craving, consciousness [and volition and aspiration] are supported in a lower [or middling or excellent] realm. Thus, in the future, there is rebecoming (A.I.223). Given that Buddhism holds that, in principle, anyone can uncover buried memories of many past lives, this requires some concept of an unconscious level of mind. This is also the most appropriate "store" of karmic traces which have not yet produced all of their results. In many cases, the results can be seen as working by means "internal" to a person: its direct effects on character, and the arising of its results through means such as ineptitude in business (D.II.85, A.II.81-82) or illness (Sn. 125). Karma is also seen as bringing its results, though, through the external world and the action of other beings. This implies, of course, that it can bring about its results "at a distance." The karmic results of harming the harmless are said to include "loss of relatives, or destruction of wealth, or 49 Journal of Buddhist Ethics ravaging by fire that will destroy his houses" (Dhp.139-140). At A.II.74-75, it is said that, due to the unrighteousness of a king and his people: moon and sun revolve unevenly. This being so, constellations and stars do likewise; days and nights, months and fortnights, seasons and years revolve unevenly; the winds blow unevenly, out of season. The gods are thus annoyed. This being so, the sky-god does not bestow sufficient rain. Consequently, the crops are poor and the people are short-lived and sickly. Whatever one makes of the details of this passage, it views immoral actions as upsetting the natural order, and karmic results as arising through environmental and climatic intermediaries: the world reacts to the moral and spiritual level of its inhabitants (as perhaps echoed in contemporary global warming). A similar idea is expressed in the Aggañña Sutta (D.III.8593), which describes the evolution of human society from the earlier sexless beings that inhabited the earth at the start of a world-cycle. Here, as the beings degenerate morally from a god-like beginning, the physical world evolves and becomes more solid and diversified. For example, due to the greed of the beings, they hoard rice, so that while it originally grew to maturity in a day, it comes to grow in the normal way. At the individual level, the reaction of the environment to karma can be seen at J.I.167, where a thunderbolt causes a rock to split and so kill a goat, due to its karma of a past life (though one might say that past karma put the goat in harm's way, but did not itself help to cause the arising of the thunderbolt). Karmic results also come through the actions of other people. At Thig.400-447, an Arahat nun says that, in a past rebirth, she had been a male adulterer, who had then, as a result of this karma, gone through a rebirth in a hell, then as three kinds of animals who were castrated, as a Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 50 hermaphrodite human, as a troublesome co-wife and, in her current life, as a woman rejected by several husbands. Moreover, a layman who gives alms will, if he becomes a monk, be "often asked to accept alms" (A.II.32), and even the murder of the enlightened monk Moggallāna is seen as the result of past karma (J.V.126, in commentarial part; cf.Dhp.A.III.65-71). Visuddhimagga 229 is quite clear that death due to being attacked with weapons can be due to person's past karma. In the Lakkhaṇa Sutta (D.III.142-179), thirty-two characteristics of the Buddha's body are described, individually or in groups, as the product of particular past good actions, and as signs of good things to come, which must also be seen as karmic results. These results include: (1) Physical qualities: being long-lived, of little illness, with good digestion, tolerant of exertion; having a persuasive voice; (2) Mental qualities: learning quickly, great wisdom, rich in spiritual possessions, which he cannot lose; (3) Relations with and treatment by others: being foremost among renouncers; having many followers, who are well-disposed, loyal and obedient to him and united amongst themselves; receiving good food and fine fabrics; inability to be impeded or overcome by any enemy. Is everything due to karma? If karma is seen as bringing about its effects partly through events in the world and actions of other people, does this mean that everything is seen as happening due to karma? The answer, for the Theravāda tradition, is "no": most things in the animate and inanimate world are seen as not due to 51 Journal of Buddhist Ethics karma, though they are conditioned in other ways. At S.IV.230-231, the Buddha discusses the various causes of the experiences (feelings/sensations: vedayitāni) that a person might have. They can originate: in bile...in phlegm ...in the winds (of the body) ...from a union of humors (of the body) ...born of a change of season ...born of the stress of circumstances ...due to (someone else’s) effort (opakkamikāni)... and some things that are experienced here, Sīvaka, arise born of the maturing of karma. It is thus seen as incorrect to say that, "Whatever this person experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, all that is due to what was done earlier." This passage is discussed at Milindapañha 134138, where king Milinda is described as wrongly thinking that "all that is experienced is rooted in karma." The monk Nāgasena points out the various causes of feelings, as above, and moreover denies that karma underlies them all. Bodily winds, for example, can arise from a number of physical causes, though some do also arise due to past karma. On feelings in general, he says "small is what is born of the maturing of karma, greater is the remainder" (135). Miln. 271 also says that, "The earth and the mountains and wind are all born of physical change (utujā)." The Milindapañha 134-138 discussion is in relation to illnesses and injuries that the Buddha suffered. King Milinda says to venerable Nāgasena that the Buddha is seen as beyond the results of past bad karma (this is not said of Arahats other than the Buddha, though: see case of Moggallāna, above), and that this contradicts his suffering illnesses and injuries. Nāgasena discusses the case of the Buddha's foot being injured by a splinter of rock from a boulder rolled down towards him by his jealous cousin Devadatta. Of the list Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 52 of possible causes of the unpleasant sensations this led to, only two are seen as possible: past karma and "due to an effort." As none of the Buddha's illnesses or injuries are seen as due to his past karma (or to stress of circumstances), though, the injury must have arisen "due to an effort"—of Devadatta. The late canonical text the Apadāna (I.299 ff.), though, differs from the view of the post-canonical, though influential, Milindapañha, for it refers to karmic causes for a number of difficulties undergone by the Buddha. After previous bad rebirths, "remnants (pilotikāni)" of the Buddha's past bad karma include: (1) Physical difficulties: a bad headache; a backache; diarrhea; (2) Difficulties due to the actions of other people: suffering wrongful accusations; three attempts on his life instigated by Devadatta, including the one which resulted in an injury to his foot; getting poor alms food for a period; (3) Difficulties from his own actions: practicing fruitless asceticism for six years. Within Theravāda Buddhism, then, there are some differences of opinion on the extent of the effect of karma, at least where it comes to the Buddha. In the Abhidhamma literature, which is in part a later systematizing of earlier Sutta material, there is a view which is potentially at odds with the idea that there are many events in the world not due to karma. It is held that in any sense channel, for example the visual, there is a senseconsciousness, in this case, eye-consciousness (awareness of a visual object), rapidly followed by mind-consciousnesses that make sense of and respond to such an object. What is important, here, is that eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue53 Journal of Buddhist Ethics and body-consciousness are all seen as results of past karma. How can this be, if what they are conscious of is regarded as generally not due to past karma? A combination of three possible answers seems appropriate: (1) Karma determines what kind of being someone is reborn as, and as different kinds of beings have different kinds of sense-organs, which are sensitive in different ways (e.g., human sight compared to that of a fly or eagle), then the form of a being's consciousness is influenced by karma; (2) A certain visual scene may not be due to past karma, but that a certain person is in a particular location so as to see it can be seen as possibly due to past karma; (3) Even if there are two people in the same place, they will notice different aspects of what is available to see, for example one will tend to notice pleasant aspects, and the other unpleasant. It is in this sense that their sense-consciousnesses can be seen as the result of past karma: it filters awareness of the surrounding environment so that only particular "edited highlights" tend to be noticed. The third explanation is not explicitly given in any text, but fits in well with other Buddhist ideas. It is supported by a passage at S.I.91-92, which recounts a tale of a man who is rich due to having given alms to a pacceka-buddha in a past life, but a miser unable to enjoy what wealth might buy due to later having regretted his generosity. Here, one can say, past karma entails that the man only notices unpleasant, unenticing aspects of the world. Harvey, "Freedom of the Will" in the Light of Theravāda Buddhist Teachings 54