Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper Successful Takeovers without Exclusion

Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper

0 1 Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper Carrot and Yardstick Regulation : Enhancing Market Performance with Output Prizes

Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper StEP

In this paper we examine government debt and tax-transfer policies that can improve the allocation of risk between generations. Markets cannot allocate risk efficiently between two generations whenever the two generations are not both alive prior to the occurrence of a stochastic event. This implies that government policies transferring risk between generations have the potential to create firs...

Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium : New Results from Old Methods

This paper provides a proof of a condition for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Existing proofs of the same condition have shown it to imply a unique element within a limited class of Cournot equilibria, but leave open the possibility of other purestrategy equilibria outside this class. A simpler approach permits us to derive the condition and to rule out the possibility of these other equili...

Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?

This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategic synergies. Alternatively...