Communicative Power in Habermas’s Theory of Democracy

This article critically examines Jürgen Habermas’s theory of democracy as developed in Between Facts and Norms. In particular, it focuses on the concept of communicative power and argues that there is a crucial ambiguity in Habermas’s use of this concept. Since communicative power is the key normative resource that is supposed to counter the norm-free steering media of money and administrative power, its role within the theory must be made clear. The article begins by explaining the normative and social-theoretic foundations of the theory. Then it highlights the normative importance of the public sphere in Habermas’s two-track model of deliberative politics, before turning to the problems with the concept of communicative power. Two alternative readings of its role are provided in order to demonstrate how it needs to be further clarified. key words: communicative power, democracy, discourse theory, Jürgen Habermas, public sphere In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas undertakes for the first time a systematic elaboration of discourse theory in relation to democratic and legal theory. Drawing on his theory of communicative rationality and discourse, he develops a model of democracy that combines a procedural account of democratic legitimacy with a deliberative politics. One of the central motivating concerns driving that project is to specify how the normative ideal of popular sovereignty may still be maintained or feasibly implemented in recognizable ways under conditions of modern social complexity. In this context, one of the central challenges is to account for the realities of money and power within the political system without utterly draining the ideal of popular sovereignty of its normative force. A theory of democracy that affirms normative notions without neglecting the difficult theoretical and political challenges posed by complex societies is certainly desirable. However, Habermas’s most significant contribution to democratic