An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We give a partial folk theorem for approximate equilibria of a class of discounted repeated games where each player receives a private signal of the play of his opponents . Our condition is that the game be "informationally connected," meaning that each player i has a deviation that can be statistically detected by player j regardless of the action of any third player k. Under the same condition, we obtain a partial folk theorem for the exact equilibria of the game with time-average payoffs, JEL Classification numbers = 022, 026
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