Between Theory and Practice: Conflict Resolution in Rwanda

Introduction The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has spawned a vast literature, as scholars and policy-makers alike try to explain and to make sense of what happened. What has tended to receive less attention, however, is the complex and multi-layered conflict resolution process that preceded the genocide. It is this process – which culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993 – that forms the focus of this chapter. For a book about the theory and practice of conflict resolution, Rwanda is a particularly important case study as it highlights a critical gap between the two. In short, the Arusha peace process can be described as " an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process gone disastrously wrong " (Jones 2001: 69). The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explain why it went so wrong. formed in neighbouring Uganda in 1987, attacked northern Rwanda from its base in southern Uganda. The members of the RPF were the children of those Tutsis who had been forced to flee Rwanda in 1959. Up until that point, the colonial powers – first Germany and later Belgium – had always favoured Rwanda " s minority Tutsis over the 3 majority Hutus, regarding the former as Hamites and thus naturally superior to the Hutus (and the Twa). In 1959, however, the Belgians switched allegiance to the Hutus. This ignited an explosion of anti-Tutsi violence, driven by the deep-seated grievances and anger that the colonialists " discriminatory policies had created and fuelled among the Hutus. These grievances, in turn, were to play a significant role in the 1994 genocide, as Hutu extremists tapped into and exploited Hutu fears of once again being made subordinate to the Tutsis. Following its attack on Rwanda in 1990, the RPF, which had close links to Uganda and President Yoweri Museveni, became engaged in a three-year conflict with the Rwandan army (FAR). According to Hutu extremists within President Juvénal Habyarimana " s regime, however, it was not only the RPF who posed a fundamental threat. Rather, all Tutsis, by extension, were the enemy. The message that began to circulate, therefore, propagated in particular by the radio station Radio Télévision des Mille Collines (RTML), was that the Tutsi " inyenzi " or cockroaches needed to be exterminated. As the situation continued to deteriorate, moreover, two significant moments of crisis occurred. The first democratically-elected Hutu president of neighbouring …