Extensive Form Games
نویسنده
چکیده
e c a s t s a b o u t t h e f u t u r e m a r k e t. u c t m a r k e t , fi r m s m u s t m a k e d e c i s i o n s a b o u t w h e t h e r t o e n t e r m a r k e t s a n d w h a t p r o d-u c t s t o i n t r o d u c e .
منابع مشابه
Game Equivalence Note for van Benthem Workshop
The most famous work on game equivalence is Thomson (1952) “Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form.” Two more recent works which serve as inspiration for the present project are Bonanno (1992) “Set-Theoretic Equivalence of ExtensiveForm Games” and van Benthem (2001) “Extensive Games as Process Models.” Thomson frames the debate by considering a large space of games (extensive form games) and a ...
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